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IMPLEMENTING EFFECTIVE  
REGIONAL OCEAN GOVERNANCE: 
PERSPECTIVES FROM ECONOMICS 
SUSAN STEELE HANNA† 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The United States Commission on Ocean Policy (“USCOP”) 
made several important recommendations pertaining to ecosystem-
based ocean governance.1 The first is the establishment of a national 
ocean policy framework.2 This framework would include national 
coordination among federal agencies, harmonized management of 
offshore ocean uses, strengthened and streamlined federal agencies, 
and the voluntary formation of regional ocean councils. Coordination 
and leadership at the federal level would be provided by a National 
Ocean Council (cabinet secretaries and federal agency directors) and 
a Presidential Council of Advisors on Ocean Policy within the 
Executive Office of the President. The second recommendation is to 
encourage the formation of voluntary regional ocean councils.3 The 
regional ocean councils would have broader jurisdictional boundaries 
than traditional resource agencies and their functions would include 
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 1. U.S. COMM’N ON OCEAN POLICY, AN OCEAN BLUEPRINT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: 
FINAL REPORT OF THE U.S. COMMISSION ON OCEAN POLICY (2004);                           
[hereinafter USCOP REPORT], available at http://www.oceancommission.gov/ 
documents/full_color_rpt/000_ocean_full_report.pdf; J. Sanchirico & S. Hanna, Navigating U.S. 
Fishery Management into the 21st Century, 19 MARINE RESOURCE ECON. 395 (2004). 
 2. USCOP REPORT, supra note 1, at chs. 4-7. 
 3. Id. at ch. 5. 
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the coordination of state, territorial, tribal, and local governments, 
the collection and synthesis of regional ocean information, and the 
performance of ecosystem assessments. 
To support these new national and regional governance 
structures, the USCOP recommended that Congress, working with 
the national and regional ocean councils, develop new laws, policies, 
and institutions for ecosystem-based management. It recommends the 
strengthening of international fishery agreements and of the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Association’s (“NOAA”) role as the lead 
ocean agency through consolidation of ocean and coastal programs 
and the implementation of interagency ecosystem-based management 
approaches.4 The USCOP further recommends that ecosystem-scale 
management be implemented to promote innovation, learning, and 
adaptation.5 It also stresses the importance of realizing the full 
economic potential of the ocean’s resources and of considering 
people as part of the ecosystem.6 
In making these recommendations, the USCOP clearly 
recognized that many of the problems facing ocean resources are 
institutional in their cause and are compounded by problems of the 
mismatch between private incentives and social goals. As the 
USCOP’s recommendations for new ocean governance structures are 
carried forward to implementation, they will involve the construction 
of new or expanded organizations. To ensure that new structures are 
as effective as possible, Congress must be mindful of a fundamental 
institutional design principle: There are a number of incentive 
problems that beset complex organizations, and these can increase 
transaction costs and limit performance effectiveness. Anticipating 
these problems at the design stage can help in the construction of new 
governance structures that minimize or avoid them. 
II.  INSTITUTIONAL INCENTIVE PROBLEMS 
A number of important incentive problems limit resource 
manager effectiveness by complicating long-term views and adding to 
uncertainties.7 Unless specifically anticipated and avoided at the 
design stage, these incentive problems will continue to be amplified in 
 
 4. Id. at ch. 7. 
 5. Id. at 63-67. 
 6. Id. at 63. 
 7. S. Hanna, Institutions for Marine Ecosystems: Economic Incentives and Fishery 
Management, 8 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 170 (1998). 
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the new regional and national ocean governance structures. 
Literature on organizational economics offers insight into a number 
of important incentive problems afflicting organizations. 
A. Power Ambiguity 
Uncertainty about power distribution leads to power struggles 
and to the questioning and undermining of authorities.8 Power 
ambiguity is a problem that has troubled the United States fishery 
management system as implemented under the Magnuson-Stevens 
Fishery Conservation and Management Act. Although the relative 
roles and responsibilities at different levels of management hierarchy 
are detailed in law and implementing regulations, confusion among 
management participants concerning the hierarchy of management—
who has the authority to make which decisions, and when—is 
common.9 Authority is accordingly challenged, and power struggles 
between entities persist. The intermittent intrusion of ad hoc 
managers such as Congress or the Courts adds further ambiguity 
about who is in charge. 
B. Failure to Make Credible Commitments 
Credible commitments exist when what is promised is reliably 
delivered.10 The ability of a regional ocean council or its associated 
members to make credible commitments, or their inverse, credible 
threats, will rest on management’s ability to enter into contracts with 
ocean interests. If property rights over ocean resources are absent, 
and if the management environment is uncertain or unstable, 
managers may be prevented from making either commitments or 
threats with credibility. 
C. Low-Intensive Incentives 
Low-intensive incentives exist when there are weak connections 
between a person’s decisions and the consequences of those 
decisions11 because accountability is absent. The lack of direct 
accountability for management outcomes has been commonly named 
 
 8. K.J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 65 (1974). 
 9. J.P. WISE, FEDERAL CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT OF MARINE FISHERIES IN 
THE UNITED STATES 164-65 (1991); S. HANNA ET AL., FISHING GROUNDS: DEFINING A NEW 
ERA FOR AMERICAN FISHERY MANAGEMENT 82 (2000). 
 10. O.E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 167 (1985). 
 11. Id. at 140. 
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as a problem facing the regional fishery management councils.12 
Monitoring performance of management plans is not routinely done, 
and there is no institutional mechanism to tie the performance of 
managers to a system of professional or monetary rewards. In the 
past, regional council members have received almost no professional 
training to equip them for their positions.13 Regional ocean councils, 
as voluntary coordinating mechanisms across multiple jurisdictions 
and agencies, may be particularly susceptible to problems created by 
low-intensive incentives. 
D. Moral Hazard 
Moral hazard exists when some actions are unobservable for 
some reason, such as costly observation. Such cases create the 
potential for shirking and can affect the enforcement of contracts.  
These contracts can include, for example, fishery regulations, staff 
performance, or agreements on decision processes.14 As 
organizational complexity increases, the opportunity for 
unobservable actions also increases, and the transparency of 
processes decreases. Fishery management offers a good example of 
how this works. Although a number of elements of the “notice and 
comment” process of fishery management are designed to promote 
transparency in decisionmaking, complexities of a decision process 
and allocation rules designed to address needs of many different 
interests create many obstacles to transparency.15 This same general 
tradeoff between complexity and transparency applies equally to 
other publicly regulated processes. 
E. Bounded Rationality 
Bounded rationality is behavior that intends to be rational but is 
limited by uncertainty and inconsistency. Combined with 
opportunism, it can lead to uncertain outcomes.16 High levels of 
uncertainty in regional ocean management, if created by conflict over 
authorities, rights, or management philosophies, could limit the 
degree to which managers can be rationally foresighted and prevent 
the completion of actions that would simplify and stabilize 
 
 12. HANNA ET AL., supra note 9, at 92-93. 
 13. Id. at 95-96. 
 14. T. EGGERTSSON, ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND INSTITUTIONS 44-45 (1990). 
 15. HANNA ET AL., supra note 9, at 88-90. 
 16. WILLIAMSON, supra note 10, at 30. 
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management. Under conditions of bounded rationality, continual 
bargaining is the norm, which sometimes adds costs that dissipate 
potential gains from bargaining.17 An additional and negative effect of 
uncertainty for ocean resource sustainability is that it leads people to 
shorten the time horizon over which planning is done through 
discounting uncertain future benefits more heavily and placing 
relatively higher value on current benefits.18 
F. Truncated Learning 
Learning-by-doing can be a way for organizations to increase 
proficiency, adapt to changing circumstances, and reduce costs.19 But 
opportunities for learning-by-doing and adaptation can be limited by 
decisionmaking environments that combine uncertainty, a tightly 
proscribed regulatory process, and strategic information shaping. If 
the flow of information tends to be vertical and hierarchical, rather 
than horizontal, opportunities for internal learning and flexible 
adaptation are further limited.20 This problem can be directly 
addressed through program performance monitoring and evaluation 
that is built into the management system. Lack of routine monitoring 
and evaluation has created problems for adaptive learning in fishery 
management. For example, although regional fishery management 
councils are required to produce annual Stock Assessment and 
Fishery Evaluation documents that assess the status of stocks and the 
economics of the fishery,21 they are not required to include strategic 
plans for experimentation or adaptation. Lack of flexibility can serve 
the purpose of public transparency and predictability, but it can also 
hinder rapid adaptation to changing conditions.22 
Power ambiguity, low-intensive incentives, moral hazard, 
bounded rationality, a lack of credible commitment, and truncated 
learning: Each of these aspects of the incentive environment create 
problems for public resource management. All complicate the 
application of knowledge in management and keep the private 
incentives of decisionmakers and other management participants 
from being fully aligned with public objectives. 
 
 17. NEGOTIATION ANALYSIS 88-90 (H.P. Young ed., 1991). 
 18. HANNA ET AL., supra note 9, at 115-17. 
 19. J. TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 71-72 (1988). 
 20. Id. at 329-30. 
 21. See Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C § 1853 
(2000). 
 22. HANNA ET AL., supra note 9, at 88-90. 
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III.  THE PACIFIC SALMON EXAMPLE 
Pacific Salmon are a good example of the complex requirements 
of regional ocean governance and the institutional incentive problems 
that plague governance systems. Anadromous salmon traverse a wide 
range of ecosystems in the course of their life histories as they migrate 
from watersheds to rivers to oceans and then back to freshwater natal 
streams to spawn.23 In ecological terms, they serve as integrators of 
riverine and coastal ecosystems.  In larger economic and social terms, 
however, salmon are polarizers, creating economic and political 
conflict through actions taken for their protection and restoration. 
Problems of biodiversity protection in salmon illustrate complexities 
facing the realignment of rights and responsibilities in the coastal 
zone.24 
Salmon management takes place over multiple jurisdictions using 
complex rules designed to protect wild stocks in an environment of 
controversy over wild-hatchery stock interactions and conflicts among 
various users. Salmon management is coordinated through interstate 
compacts, a U.S.-Canada treaty, state agencies, regional fishery 
management councils, the National Marine Fisheries Service, judicial 
authorities, and protective statutes that require extensive consultation 
on actions affecting protected species.25 
A. Harvest Management of Pacific Salmon 
A recent report of the Independent Science Advisory Board of 
the Northwest Power and Conservation Council details the complex 
structure and processes of harvest management for Pacific salmon.26 
1. Management Entities 
In part, the complexity of management arises because migration 
of salmon takes them across many different jurisdictions that share 
authority over stock control. Harvest management decisions in ocean 
 
 23. THOMAS P. QUINN, THE BEHAVIOR AND ECOLOGY OF PACIFIC SALMON AND TROUT 
5 (2005). 
 24. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, UPSTREAM: SALMON AND SOCIETY IN THE PACIFIC 
NORTHWEST (1996). 
 25. Federal Caucus, Conservation of Columbia Basin Fish: Building a Conceptual 
Recovery Plan (Dec. 1999) (working paper), available at http://www.salmonrecovery.gov/ 
Conservation.pdf. 
 26. INDEP. SCI. ADVISORY BD., REPORT ON HARVEST MANAGEMENT OF COLUMBIA 
BASIN SALMON AND STEELHEAD (2005) (Nw. Power & Conservation Council, Document No. 
ISAB 2005-4), available at http://www.nwcouncil.org/library/isab/isab2005-4.htm [hereinafter 
ISAB]. 
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fisheries are made in state, tribal, regional, federal, and international 
jurisdictions. No single entity is responsible for ensuring that 
management objectives are met.27 The following are the groups that 
take part in Pacific salmon management decisions: 
 
Pacific Salmon Commission: The Commission was 
established by the 1985 Pacific Salmon Treaty between the 
United States and Canada and has no formal regulatory 
authority.28 The Commission develops fishery agreements 
that will govern the regulation of fisheries by the domestic 
managers of the United States and Canada.29 
 
Regional Fishery Management Councils: The Magnuson-
Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 
established a system of eight regional fishery management 
councils.30 Two of these, the Pacific Fishery Management 
Council (Washington, Oregon, California, and Idaho) and 
the North Pacific Fishery Management Council (Alaska) are 
responsible for managing ocean salmon fisheries.31 
 
United States Secretary of Commerce: Final approval 
authority for management recommendations forwarded by 
regional fishery management councils lies with the U.S. 
Secretary of Commerce.32 
 
Department of Fisheries and Oceans Canada: This Canadian 
department regulates Canadian ocean fisheries.33 
 
Tribal Managers: These managers regulate Indian treaty troll 
fisheries under the umbrella ocean fishery regulations 
recommended by the Pacific Fishery Management Council 
and approved by the Secretary of Commerce.34 
 
 
 27. Id. 
 28. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3631-3644 (2000). 
 29. Pacific Salmon Commission, www.psc.org (last visited Feb. 8, 2005). 
 30. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1883 (2000). 
 31. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1862-1863. 
 32. 16 U.S.C. § 1854(a)(3). 
 33. Further information on the Department of Fisheries and Oceans Canada is available at 
http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/home-accueil_e.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2006). 
 34. Pacific Fishery Management Council, Fishery Management, www.pcouncil.org/salmon 
(last visited Feb. 8, 2005). 
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State Agencies: Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife,35 
Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife,36 and the 
Alaska Department of Fish & Game37 manage fisheries in 
state territorial waters. 
2. Legal Environment of Management 
Managing the harvest of Pacific salmon throughout their life 
cycle requires extensive coordination among all the above entities, 
within the constraint of a suite of applicable legal requirements. 
These requirements include Indian treaties, obligations under the 
Pacific Salmon Treaty between the United States and Canada,38 
federal statutes such as the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation 
and Management Act,39 the National Environmental Policy Act,40 and 
Endangered Species Act,41 domestic and state statutes, and applicable 
case law. Four areas of law have special significance to harvest 
management of Pacific salmon:42 
 
Indian Treaty Fishing Rights: Through treaties with the 
United States, Indian tribes reserved the right to take fish at 
their usual and accustomed places. Courts have determined 
that treaties entitle tribes to 50% of the harvestable surplus 
of fish originating in or passing through their usual and 
accustomed fishing places.43 Non-Indian governments are not 
authorized to regulate Indian fishing except when necessary 
for resource conservation.44 
 
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management 
Act (“MSFCMA”): In addition to the institutional structures 
 
 35. Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife, http://www.dfw.state.or.us/ (last visited Mar. 
22, 2006). 
 36. Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife, http://wdfw.wa.gov/ (last visited Mar. 22, 
2006). 
 37. Alaska Department of Fish and Game, http://www.adfg.state.ak.us/ (last visited Mar. 
22, 2006). 
 38. Pacific Salmon Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3631-3644 (2000). 
 39. Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1883 
(2000). 
 40. National Environmental Policy Act, 83 Stat. 852 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
4321-4370 (2000)). 
 41. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000). 
 42. ISAB, supra note 26. 
 43. Sohappy v. Smith, 529 F.2d 570, 573-74 (1976) (upholding district court decree defining 
Native American treaty rights). 
 44. Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F. Supp. 899, 908 (1969). 
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of regional councils, the MSFCMA sets forth a set of national 
standards that must be attained for ocean salmon fishery 
management.45 
 
The Endangered Species Act (“ESA”): Numerous salmon 
populations from the Columbia River have been listed as 
threatened or endangered under the ESA.46 Harvest 
management actions that impact these populations are 
subject to consultations with NOAA Fisheries (for 
anadromous forms) and the U.S. Fishery and Wildlife Service 
(for resident forms).47 Harvest management decisions 
affecting ESA-listed populations must meet a “no jeopardy” 
requirement of the legislation.48 Assessment of whether a 
harvest action will cause “jeopardy” is documented in a 
“biological opinion” by the responsible agency and annual 
guidance letters that advise harvest managers how to comply 
in their implementation.49 An assessment of the Pacific 
Fishery Management Council’s recommended fishery 
regulations with respect to these standards is provided to the 
Secretary of Commerce as part of the record of decision for 
proposed harvest management measures.50 
 
Columbia River Compact: Established through Congressional 
mandate, the Columbia River Compact (“Compact”) is a 
collaboration between Oregon and Washington, in 
coordination with Treaty Indian tribes, that was instructed to 
manage the commercial fisheries in the Columbia River. The 
Compact must consider the effect of commercial fishing for 
salmon, steelhead, and sturgeon in the Columbia River on 
escapement, treaty rights, and sport fisheries, as well as the 
impact on species listed under the Endangered Species Act. 
Although the Compact has no authority to adopt sport 
fishing seasons or rules, it indirectly regulates these fisheries 
by making commercial-recreational allocation of allowable 
impacts on protected stocks.51 
 
 45. 16 U.S.C. § 1851 (2000). 
 46. 16 U.S.C. § 1533. 
 47. Id. § 1536. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. ISAB, supra note 26. 
 51. WASH. DEP’T OF FISH & WILDLIFE & OR. DEP’T OF FISH & WILDLIFE, JOINT STATE 
MANAGEMENT OF COLUMBIA RIVER SALMON AND STURGEON NON-INDIAN HARVEST 
ALLOCATIONS (2005). 
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B. Evolution of Institutional Arrangements 
The number of entities involved in the management of Pacific 
salmon and the number of overarching legal mandates require a high 
degree of coordination and cooperation among parties to control 
harvest impacts across jurisdictions. This coordination is evidenced in 
an extensive and detailed system of scientific advice and management 
decisionmaking.52 Both formal and informal coordination of advisory 
and decisionmaking functions occur. 
These systems have evolved in response to changing biological, 
oceanic, legal, social, and economic environments. Over time, the 
physical effect of river and coastal uses on salmon, estuaries, and the 
coastal zone, and laws enacted to protect salmon from extinction, 
have forced a greater connectivity to fishery issues achieved through 
increasingly complex consultations and coordination.53 As such, these 
systems represent an adaptation to formal requirements, physical and 
natural environments, and human dynamics. They are regional 
institutional adaptations to ecosystem-level requirements. 
Still, attainment of management objectives is problematic. Large 
scale variability and scientific uncertainty are significant limiting 
factors in the implementation of management objectives.54 
Additionally, historical interests form powerful “lords of yesterday” 
that create inertia in the institutional mix.55 All six institutional 
incentive problems described above, power ambiguity, low-intensive 
incentives, moral hazard, bounded rationality, a lack of credible 
commitment, and truncated learning are present in Pacific salmon 
management.56 
IV.  DESIGN QUESTIONS FOR REGIONAL OCEAN COUNCILS 
The example of complexities and difficulties in Pacific salmon 
management is emblematic for regional ocean councils. It points the 
 
 52. ISAB, supra note 26; PAC. FISHERY MGMT. COUNCIL, PRESEASON REPORT III, 
ANALYSIS OF COUNCIL-ADOPTED MANAGEMENT MEASURES FOR 2005 OCEAN SALMON 
FISHERIES (2005). This report was prepared by the Salmon Technical Team of the Pacific 
Fishery Management Council, 7700 NE Ambassador Place, Suite 200, Portland, OR 97220. 
 53. ISAB, supra note 26. 
 54. Id. 
 55. C.F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER AND THE FUTURE 
OF THE WEST ch. 1 (1992). 
 56. S. Hanna, Designing Institutions for Columbia River Salmon: Identifying the Key 
Uncertainties, in WHAT WE DON’T KNOW ABOUT PACIFIC NORTHWEST FISH RUNS: AN 
INQUIRY INTO DECISION-MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 77-90 (P. Koss & M. Katz eds., 
2000). 
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way to some key design questions facing development of new 
institutional structures: 
 
(1) How do we minimize incentive problems and transactions 
costs? Can we anticipate common sources of each and apply 
management tools to contain them? 
(2) Can we craft a unifying goal across political boundaries, 
multiple uses, and traditional and new interest groups? 
(3) How will we adapt to uncertainty? In recognition that it is 
ubiquitous, can we develop limited information and 
conservative management approaches that are less 
dependent on precision of estimates? 
(4) Are there limits to scale? Is it possible to integrate 
boundaries of governance and ecosystems in a cost effective 
way? 
(5) Are there limits to coordination? Is it possible to build 
effective coordination without overloading available time 
and fiscal resources? 
(6) What are appropriate policy instruments to coordinate 
across various ecosystem components, interest groups, and 
communities? 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Implementing the USCOP’s recommended regional governance 
structures will require new laws, policies, and institutions for 
ecosystem-based management. It will involve consolidation of ocean 
and coastal programs and implementation of interagency ecosystem-
based management approaches. The USCOP recommends that these 
structures be designed to promote innovation, learning, and 
adaptation as well as to realize full economic potential of the ocean’s 
resources and accommodate ocean resource users.57 
This paper has outlined some institutional design problems 
inherent in this recommendation. A number of well-established 
institutional incentive problems are described. Pacific salmon is 
presented as an example of a complex governance structure that 
embodies the full range of incentive problems. 
When considering impacts of change it is always useful to 
compare it to impacts of not changing. It is possible to be stuck in an 
 
 57. USCOP REPORT, supra note 1, at ch. 3. 
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institutional mix either because the benefits of inertia are great 
enough that people are willing to absorb large transactions costs or 
they are able to shift those costs externally. Without the ability to 
absorb or shift transactions costs, people will search for ways to 
bypass change obstacles to achieve better political outcomes and 
reduce costs.58 This may be a key determinant in how people respond 
to the possibility of establishing regional ocean councils. 
 
 58. A. Dixit, Transaction Cost Politics and Economic Policy: A Framework and a Case 
Study, in INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION IN THE ADVANCED ECONOMIES: THE 
GOVERNANCE PERSPECTIVE 139-76 (M. Baldassarri et al. eds., 1998). 
